2014年MBA英语阅读理解(精读精解)(34)

　　It is a devastating prospect. Terrorists electronically break into the computers that control the water supply of a large American city, open and close valves to contaminate the water with untreated sewage or toxic chemicals, and then release it in a devastating flood. As the emergency services struggle to respond, the terrorists strike again, shutting down the telephone network and electrical power grid with just a few mouse clicks. Businesses are paralysed, hospitals are overwhelmed and roads are gridlocked as people try to flee.

　　This kind of scenario is invoked by doom-mongers who insist that stepping up physical security since the September 11th attacks is not enough. Road-blocks and soldiers around power stations cannot prevent digital terrorism. "Until we secure our cyber-infrastructure, a few keystrokes and an Internet connection is all one needs to disable the economy and endanger lives," Lamar Smith, a Texas congressman, told a judiciary committee in February. He ended with his catchphrase: "A mouse can be just as dangerous as a bullet or a bomb." Is he right?

　　It is true that utility companies and other operators of critical infrastructure are increasingly connected to the Internet. But just because an electricity company's customers can pay their bills online, it does not necessarily follow that the company's critical control systems are vulnerable to attack. Control systems are usually kept entirely separate from other systems, for good reason. They tend to be obscure, old-fashioned systems that are incompatible with Internet technology anyhow. Even authorised users require specialist knowledge to operate them. And telecoms firms, hospitals and businesses usually have contingency plans to deal with power failures or flooding.

　　A simulation carried out in August by the United States Naval War College in conjunction with Gartner, a consultancy, concluded that an "electronic Pearl Harbour" attack on America's critical infrastructure could indeed cause serious disruption, but would first need five years of preparation and $200m of funding. There are far simpler and less costly ways to attack critical infrastructure, from hoax phone calls to truck bombs and hijacked airliners.

　　On September 18th Richard Clarke, America's cyber-security tsar, unveiled his long-awaited blueprint for securing critical infrastructure from digital attacks. It was a bit of a damp squib, making no firm recommendations and proposing no new regulation or legislation. But its lily-livered approach might, in fact, be the right one. When a risk has been overstated, inaction may be the best policy.

　　It is difficult to avoid comparisons with the "millennium bug" and the predictions of widespread computer chaos arising from the change of date to the year 2000. Then, as now, the alarm was sounded by technology vendors and consultants, who stood to gain from scare-mongering. But Ross Anderson, a computer scientist at Cambridge University, prefers to draw an analogy with the environmental lobby. Like eco-warriors, he observes, those in the security industry--be they vendors trying to boost sales, academics chasing grants, or politicians looking for bigger budgets--have a built-in incentive to overstate the risks.

　　1. We learn from the first paragraph that ____________.

　　[A] terrorists could plunge a large American city into chaos through electronic attack

　　[B] American people have no experience in dealing with terrorists

　　[C] the computer systems of utility companies are rather vulnerable

　　[D] the response of emergency services is far from satisfactory

　　2. Speaking of the doom-mongers, the author implies that_____________.

　　[A] their worries are quite reasonable

　　[B] their warnings should be taken seriously

　　[C] they exaggerate the threat utility companies are facing

　　[D] they are familiar with they way terrorists strike

　　3. In the view of Gartner consultant, ___________.

　　[A] terrorists may launch another “Pearl Harbor” attack

　　[B] terrorists have ample capital and time to prepare a stunning strike

　　[C] it is very costly and time-consuming to attack critical infrastructure

　　[D] it is unlikely that terrorists would resort to electronic means to attack critical infrastructure

　　4. “Lily-livered approach” (Line 4, Paragraph 5) probably means an approach characterized by________.

　　[A] flexibility

　　[B] boldness

　　[C] cowardice

　　[D] conservatism

　　5. We learn from the last paragraph that__________.

　　[A] the computer industry suffered heavy loss due to the “millennium bug”

　　[B] doom-mongers care more about their own interests than national security

　　[C] computer scientists have better judgment than doom-mongers

　　[D] environmentalists are criticized for their efforts of protecting environment

　　答案：ACDCB

　　篇章剖析

　　本篇文章是一篇议论文，驳斥了恐怖分子会利用电子手段袭击公用事业公司和关键基础设施的观点。文章第一段是散布恐怖威胁论者所描绘的恐怖分子用电子手段进行恐怖袭击的场景。第二段介绍了他们所宣扬的观点。第三段反驳了对公用事业公司发动电子恐怖袭击的可能性。第四段以一次模拟演习的结论进一步佐证了恐怖分子不可能用电子手段对关键基础设施进行恐怖袭击的观点。第五段分析了散布恐怖威胁论的人的动机。

　　词汇注释

　　valve[vAlv] n. 阀门

　　contaminate[kEn5tAmineit] v. 弄脏;污染

　　sewage[5sju(:)idV] n. 下水道, 污水

　　paralyze[5pArElaIz] v. 使无力[无效]; 使不活动

　　gridlocked[5^ridlCkt] adj. 交通拥堵的

　　scenario[si5nB:riEu] n. 预料或期望的一系列事件的梗概或模式;场景

　　invoke[in5vEuk] v. 借助求助于;使用或应用：

　　doom-monger n. 末世论者;散布恐怖威胁论的人

　　cyber-[5saibE] prefix. 网络的

　　infrastructure[5InfrEstrQktFE(r)] n. 基本设施

　　catchphrase[5kAtFfreIz] n. 标语;引为标语的短句;口头禅

　　utility[ju:5tiliti] n. 公用事业

　　obscure[Eb5skjuE] adj. 难懂的

　　incompatible[7inkEm5pAtEbl] adj. 不相容的, 矛盾的, 不能和谐共存的(with)

　　authorize[5C:WEraIz] v. 授权;批准;认可

　　contingency[kEn5tindVEnsi] n.

　　conjunction n. 意外， 意外事故

　　consultancy[kEn5sQltEnsi] n. 顾问(工作)

　　disruption[dis5rQpFEn] n. 破坏

　　hoax[hEJks] n. 恶作剧;骗局

　　tsar[zB:(r)] n. 沙皇

　　squib[skwib] n. 爆竹

　　millennium[mi5leniEm] n. 千禧年

　　vendor[5vendC:] n. 小贩, 叫卖

　　analogy[E5nAlEdVi] n. 类推;类比

　　难句突破

　　Like eco-warriors, he observes, those in the security industry--be they vendors trying to boost sales, academics chasing grants, or politicians looking for bigger budgets--have a built-in incentive to overstate the risks.